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ROSS v. OKLAHOMA
108 S.Ct. 2273 (1988)
In a five to four decision (Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy) the Supreme
Court held that: 1) where defendant used peremptory challenge
to remove juror who should have been removed for cause,
claim that the jury was not impartial had to focus on the jurors
who ultimately sat and not on the juror who should have been
removed for cause; 2) failure of trial court to remove the juror
for cause, with the result that the defendant had to use a
peremptory challenge to remove the juror, did not deprive
defendant of his right to an impartial jury; and 3) defendant's
right to due process was not violated by arbitrarily depriving
him full compliment of peremptory challenges under state law,
where state law required that defendant use peremptory
challenges to cure erroneous refusals by the trial court to excuse
for cause.
Affirmed
Justice Marshall dissented and filed an opinion in which Justice
Brennan, Justice Blackman and Justice Stevens joined.
FACTS
Bobby Lynn Ross was charged with and subsequently con-
victed of capital first degree murder. In the course of robbing a
motel in Elk City, Oklahoma, petitioner killed a police officer.
By statute, Oklahoma provides nine peremptory challenges to
both parties in capital trials. Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, §655 (1981).
During the selection of the jury, petitioner claimed that he
was forced to resort to using one of his peremptory challenges
to remove a potential juror whom should have been excused by
the trial court for cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1986). The trial court
denied the petitioner's motion to remove for cause a prospective
juror Huling, who had declared that he would vote to impose
death automatically if the jury found petitioner guilty. The
defense used a peremptory challenge and the juror was excused.
All nine of the defense peremptory challenges were used. The
defense did not challenge for cause any of the twleve jurors
who were ultmately selected. However, at the close of jury
selection the defense objected to the composition of the jury
empaneled (the jury was all-white) stating this jury would deny
the defendant, who is black, a fair and impartial trial by his
peers. The trial court overruled the objection. The jury found
petitioner guilty and sentenced him to death, and the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals affirmed.
CASE HISTORY
Following the sentencing hearing, petitioner appealed to the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. The court rejected peti-
tioner's argument that the trial court had committed reversible
error in failing to excuse Huling for cause. The court did agree
with petitioner that the trial court was in error by not removing
Huling for cause since the juror stated he was unwilling to
follow the law during the penalty phase and would automatical-
ly vote for imposition of the death sentence. Since defense
counsel was able to have this juror excused through use of a
peremptory challenge the wrong of the trial court had been cor-
rected. Though defense counsel did ultimately use all of their
peremptory challenges there were no objections in the "record
to show that any juror who sat on the trial was objectionable,
we are unable to discover any grounds for reversal." 717 P.2d
117, 120 (1986).
HOLDING
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment implications of the trial
court's failure to remove Huling for cause and petitioner's
subsequent use of peremptory challenge to strike Huling. 482
U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3209, 96 L.Ed.2d 969 (1987).
In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83
L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the Court held that "the proper standard
for determining when a prospective juror may be excused for
cause because of his or her views on capital punishment... is
whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath." Id., at 424, 105 S.Ct., at 852, 448
U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980).
There is no dispute by the Court that Huling should have been
excused for cause and that the trial court erred in failing to do
so. The issue before the Court was whether this violated peti-
tioner's constitutional protection.
It is well settled that a defendant has the right to be tried by
an impartial jury. This guarantee is set forth in the Federal
Constitution. The Court stated "had Huling sat on the jury
that ultimately sentenced the petitioner to death, and had the
petitioner properly preserved his right to challenge the trial
court's failure to remove Huling for cause, the sentence would
have to be overturned." This was not the case, Huling did not
sit on the jury. For the petitioner to make a valid constitutional
claim he must focus not on Huling, but on the jurors who
ultimately sat. "The Constitution preuspposes that a jury
selected from a fair cross section of the community is impartial,
regardless of the mix of viewpoints actually represented on the
jury, so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly
carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the
particular case." Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184, 106
S.Ct. 1758, 1770, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986).
The Court agreed with petitioner's claim that the failure to
remove Huling may have resulted in a jury panel different from
that which decided the case. This assertion does not, however,
entitle petitioner to reversal. There is no need to speculate
whether or not Huling would have been removed, he was in
fact removed. Petitioner argues the use of his peremptory
challenge and subsequent loss of that challenge for later was a
violation of his constitutional rights to an impartial jury. The
Court explained that the peremptory challenges are not of con-
stitutional dimension, they are a means to achieve the end, an
impartial jury. Therefore, so long as the jury which is empanel-
ed is impartial, there is no constitutional violation. The nine
peremptory challenges allowed in capital cases heard in
Oklahoma are created by statute and are not required by the
Constitution. The "right" to a peremptory challenge is only
denied if the defendant does not receive that which is provided
under the statute, the petitioner was allowed to use his nine
challenges, therefore, there was no denial of this "right."
The Court held that even though the trial court did err by
not excusing juror Huling for cause, this error did not impair
the petitioner's right to trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Con-
stitution. The decision of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals was affirmed.
DISSENT
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackman and
Stevens, opened his dissent by stating that "A man's life is at
stake. We should not be playing games." There is no debate
whether or not the trial court erred when it refused to strike the
juror, it was error and the dissent feels reversible error. The
loss of this peremptory challenge did affect the make up of the
impaneled jury. There is no way to determine that the composi-
tion of that jury would have been the same if the defendant
had not used this challenge. The issue is not whether the error
was "corrected" by the challenge, rather, the trial court erred
and this error could have had a significant affect on the jury
ultimately impaneled.
The dissent relied on, Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. -,
-, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 2055, 95 L.Ed.ed 622 (1987), where the
Court found there was a Sixth Amendment violation requiring
the resentencing of the defendant in a capital case if "the com-
position of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have been
affected by the trial court's error." In Ross the trial court,
rather than exclude a qualified juror, refused to excuse a biased
juror. The defense attempted to correct the court's error by us-
ing a peremptory challenge and argued this deprivation fell
within the Sixth Amendment protection outlined in Gray. The
dissent therefore concluded that the result reached by the ma-
jority was in direct contradiction with the holding in Gray.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
Virginia permits only four peremptory challenges, and the
jury selection process virtually ensures they will all be used. A
similar error, like the one committed by the trial court in Ross,
would require a Virginia defendant to use one fourth of his
peremptory strikes to correct that error. If a Ross situation
arises, there may be insufficient peremptory strikes to remove
all prospective jurors whom the defense has unsuccessfully
challenged for cause. In any event, Ross suggests that defense
counsel should; a) use all peremptory strikes, b) ask for more,
c) identify one juror who is to sit that would have been stricken
if a peremptory strike were available, d) note and preserve the
objection on both federal and state grounds. (Elizabeth P.
Murtagh)
FRANKLIN v. LYNAUGH
487 U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (1988)
FACTS
Donald Franklin was accused of capital murder of a woman
who had been abducted, stabbed, robbed, and possibly raped,
and who subsequently died of her wounds in a hospital.
Franklin was convicted of capital murder, Franklin v. State, 693
SW2d 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) and sentenced to death
under the Texas Special Issue sentencing scheme. The jury at
Franklin's sentencing trial answered two special issues: 1)
whether the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Franklin's conduct causing the death was committed deliberately
and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the decas-
ed or another could result, and 2) whether the jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a probability that
Franklin would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society. Affirmative answers to
the two issues would automatically require imposition of the
death penalty. Franklin's only proffered mitigating evidence was
his good conduct while in jail before and after the crime.
Franklin's requested instructions, which were not given,
specified that any mitigating evidence should be taken into ac-
count when answering the Special Issues.
The Court of Criminal Apeal of Texas affirmed the judg-
ment. Franklin v. Texas, 693 SW2d 420 (1985, Tex. Crim.).
Franklin petitioned for habeas corpus relief based on a claim
that the two special issues, absent his requested instructions, un-
constitutionally limited the jury's consideration of mitigating
evidence. (See summary of Mills v. Maryland, Supra at p. ).
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas denied Franklin's petition. Franklin v. Texas, 475 U.S.
1031 (1986). In the subsequent habeas petition, certiorari was
granted in part by Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S.Ct. 221 (1987),
and affirmed by this case.
HOLDING
a) Residual doubts as to the defendant's identity, responsibility
for the death, and intent to cause death as mitigating
circumstances.
